7 April 1967:
“… We have moved from our last position about 5 miles to the top of one of the taller mountains. This is a better position because it overlooks 2 valleys—including the main one. On a clear day, which they all are now, the coast is barely visible…. We usually put the CP [command post] by a stream, but up here that’s impossible, so all our water has to be flown in. It’s a little cooler up here at night but it’s still hot as hell during the day.“
"Our problem now is that when we get the VC cornered down in the valley, they simply go in the villages and act as if they lived there. We’ll go through the villages & know the VC are there due to the abnormal amount of men there, but they all claim to be ‘innocent civilians’ & of course some of them are. We could clean this place up, but we’d have every one from [President Lyndon] Johnson on down on us for killing civilians. But this is no problem for the Koreans. One of our capts. [captains] just spent a month with the Koreans & told me this. The Koreans don’t care about 'world opinions' & consider all Vietnamese [to be] VC until proven innocent. Each of their platoons has an interpreter (a Korean who speaks Vietnamese) while our entire btn. Is lucky to have one Vietnamese interpreter. The Koreans will go in a village & interrogate any suspicious looking person (something we can’t do) & kill them on the spot if they don’t talk. Therefore usually they talk. The Koreans burn any village that produces any evidence of shielding VC. Therefore the villages in the Koreans’ area don’t protect VC because the Korean terror is greater than the VC terror. This is why the Koreans are more successful than we are.”